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This article first appeared
in the 13 July 2005 edition of The Irish Times and is reproduced
here with their kind permission.
Jason
Burke, chief reporter for the London Observer and author
of a book on the subject, was the first to define the real
problem as al-Qaedaism. It is not a terrorist group that
the world is dealing with in the London and other bombings
and 9/11; it is an ideology or belief system. A majority
of experts now see the problem in this fashion, writes Richard
Whelan.
Adherents to this ideology, al-Qaedaists as I term them, comprise
three separate groups. First, the original core al-Qaeda group
led by Osama bin Laden and now based mainly in tribal areas in
Pakistan and border areas of Afghanistan.
Second, a range of
militants in more than 60 countries worldwide, including Islamic
Jihad in Egypt, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines,
the Taliban in Afghanistan, the armed Islamic group (GIA) in
Algeria, Ansar al-Islam and other groups in Iraq, and a number
of groups in western Europe.
The "genius" of Osama
bin Laden was to convince all those militant groups that they
should focus their attacks in
the main on the "far enemy" of the West in general
and the US in particular, rather than the "near enemy",
the government or regime in each of their countries.
By focusing
all their efforts in this fashion, what bin Laden and the other
al-Qaedaists have done is to draw a completely
disparate series of terrorist groups, which had been combating
different governments in their respective countries, into one
unified movement, at least in terms of beliefs and strategic
direction.
The third group comprises supporters drawn from the
Sunni tradition in Islam, who are willing to offer tangible support
to the militants
in their terrorist activities and are fully supportive of the
ideology.
The core al-Qaeda group and the much more extensive
groupings outside the core are thought to number somewhere around
100,000,
while the support base is thought to number anywhere between
10 million and 20 million.
There are, of course, others within
the Sunni community who support part of the belief system and
some terrorist actions, while some
support comes from outside the Sunni community, such as that
of the currently ineffective rump of the Italian Red Brigades.
Bin Laden is the leader of the core al-Qaeda group only. The
other terrorist groupings and the mass of supporters look to
him as a figurehead, rallying point and propaganda expert.
The
al-Qaedaists, particularly the core al-Qaeda group, see themselves
as a vanguard for this ideology. (The word "al-Qaeda" has
a number of meanings, but the meaning that they themselves attribute
to it is that of "model" or "precept".) They
lead by example, 9/11 being a classic "propaganda by deed" action,
and hope to have an increasing mass of supporters follow their
lead.
Many are puzzled as to what this ideology wants and why.
Many within Islam see Islam as a failure in non-religious terms,
relative
to its successful past and other societies currently.
There have
been many solutions advanced over the centuries to reverse this
relative failure, including imported solutions from
Europe from both the right and left. All have failed.
Al-Qaedaists
now believe that the only way of reversing this failure is a
return to their roots, to the form of life of the
eighth century when the glory of Islam was being established.
To achieve this return without interference, they wish to re-establish
the Sunni Islamic caliphate of old. To do this, they believe
they have to overthrow all existing Islamic governments and replace
them with Taliban-like regimes.
From that base, they would then
be in a position to retake occupied territories in a number
of other countries not currently controlled
by Islamic regimes.
To succeed in this effort, they have agreed
that they should target the "far enemy" through guerrilla
warfare targeted at civilians, to remove all Western influence
from Islamic lands.
Their ideology assumes that when that occurs
each of those regimes will quickly fall under their control,
and they will then be
close to achieving their long-term objective of the re-establishment
of the caliphate.
How can they possibly think they could succeed?
Unfortunately,
they believe that they alone were the ones who, through its defeat
in Afghanistan, caused the collapse of the
Soviet Union and communism.
They see the US as a "paper
tiger" which, if forced
back into one of its frequent periods of isolationism, will lead
to the collapse of European opposition to their plans.
To "justify" their
actions, many al-Qaedaists believe the West is involved in a
conspiracy against Islam and has been
for many centuries. They say that this conspiracy started with
the Crusades, then Western imperialism, and now ongoing Western/US
support for Israel, UN-approved actions in Afghanistan and East
Timor, and the current actions in Iraq.
Al-Qaedaism emanates
from the Sunni tradition within Islam and believes this conspiracy
includes the largest minority within
Islam, the Shia population. This explains al-Qaedaist attacks
on Shias in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.
Al-Qaedaist propaganda
frequently refers to the "conspiracies" emanating
from "Washington, Tel Aviv and Tehran". This may sound
far-fetched, but repeated statements, videos and actions of the
al-Qaedaists confirm that they believe in such conspiracies and
have and will act upon them.
The key question then is: how should
the West react to this?
The most important thing it must do
is not to fall into the trap of playing their game. There is
no clash of civilisations.
The
West is not involved in a conspiracy against Islam.
However,
the al-Qaedaists need a clash of civilisations. They can never
achieve their aims on their own.
The only way the relatively
small number of al-Qaedaists can succeed is if the rest of
the world acts as though Islam
is to blame.
Only then in a reaction to such can the al-Qaedaists
highjack Islam and its 1.3 billion adherents worldwide for
their own ends.
Richard Whelan's book, Al-Qaedaism:
The Threat to Islam, The Threat to the World will be published
in September
[2005].
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